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Abstract
Operational semantics is often presented in a rather syntactic fashion using relations
specied by inference rules or equivalently by clauses in a suitable logic program-
ming language. As it is well known, various syntactic details of specications involv-
ing bound variables can be greatly simplied if that logic programming language
has term-level abstractions (-abstraction) and proof-level abstractions (eigenvari-
ables) and the specication encodes object-level binders using -terms and universal
quantication. We shall attempt to extend this specication setting to include the
problem of specifying not only relations capturing operational semantics, such as
one-step evaluation, but also properties and relations about the semantics, such as
simulation. Central to our approach is the encoding of generic object-level judg-
ments (universally quantied formulas) as suitable atomic meta-level judgments.
We shall encode both the one-step transition semantics and simulation of (nite)
-calculus to illustrate our approach.
1 Introduction
The operational semantics of a programming or specication language is often
given in a relational style using inference rules following a small-step approach
(a.k.a. structured operational semantic [36]) or big-step approach (a.k.a. nat-
ural semantics [13]). In either case, algebraic (rst-order) terms are often
used to encode the language being specied and the rst-order theory of Horn
clauses is often used to formalize and largely mechanize such semantic speci-
cations [9].
For example, consider specifying a functional programming language that
has a conditional specied using the following inference rule (following the
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natural semantics style specication).
B + true M +V
(if B M N)+V
B + false N +V
(if B M N)+V
These two inference gures can be mapped into the two rst-order Horn clauses
8B8M8N8V [B + true ^M +V  (if B M N)+V ]
8B8M8N8V [B + false ^N +V  (if B M N)+V ]
Here, the down arrow is a non-logical, predicate symbol and an expression
such as N +V is an atomic formula. A simple adequacy result shows that
atomic formulas provable from such Horn clauses are exactly those for which
there is a proof using the corresponding inference rules.
If these two rules are the only rules describing the evaluation of the con-
ditional, then it should follow that if (if B M M)+V is provable then so is
M +V . In what logic can this be formalized and proved? For example, how
might we prove the sequent
(if B M M)+V  !M +V;
where B, M , and V are eigenvariables (universally quantied)? Since such a
sequent contains no logical connectives, the standard sequent inference rules
that introduce logical connective will not directly help here. One natural
extension of the sequent calculus is then to add left and right introduction
rules for atoms. Lars Hallnas and Peter Schroeder-Heister [7,8,40], Girard
[6], and more recently, McDowell and Miller [16,14,17] have all considered
just such introduction rules for non-logical constants. We outline this kind of
introduction rule in the next section.
2 A proof theoretic form of denitions
A denition is a nite collection of denition clauses of the form 8x[H
4
= B],
whereH is an atomic formula (the one being dened), every free variable of the
formula B is also free in H, and all variables free in H are contained in the list
x of variables. Since all free variables in H and B are universally quantied,
we often leave these quantiers implicit when displaying denitional clauses.
The atomic formula H is called the head of the clause, and the formula B is
called the body. The symbol
4
= is used simply to indicate a denitional clause:
it is not a logical connective. The same predicate may occur in the head of
multiple clauses of a denition: it is best to think of a denition as a mutually
recursive denition of the predicates in the heads of the clauses.
Given a denition, the following two inference rules are used to introduce
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dened predicates. The right introduction rule is
   ! B
   ! A
defR ;
provided that there is a clause 8x[H
4
= B] in the given denition such that A
is equal to H. The left-introduction rule is
fB;   ! C j  2 CSU(A;H) for some clause 8x[H
4
= B]g
A;   ! C
defL ;
where the variables x are chosen to be distinct from the (eigen)variables free
in the lower sequent of the rule. The set CSU(A;H) denotes a complete set
of uniers for A and H: when the CSUs and denition are nite, this rule will
have a nite number of premises. (A set S of uniers for t and u is complete
if for every unier  of t and u there is a unier  2 S such that  is  Æ  for
some substitution  [12].) There are many important situations where CSUs
are not only nite but are also singleton (containing a most general unier)
whenever terms are uniable. One such case is, of course, the rst-order case.
Another case is when the application of functional variables are restricted to
distinct bound variables in the sense of higher-order pattern unication [20,32].
In this paper, many unication problems will fall into this latter case.
We must also restrict the use of implication in the bodies of denitional
clauses, otherwise cut-elimination does not hold [39]. To that end we assume
that each predicate symbol p in the language is associated with it a natural
number lvl(p), the level of the predicate. We then extend the notion of level
to formulas and derivations. Given a formula B, its level lvl(B) is dened as
follows:
(i) lvl(p

t) = lvl(p)
(ii) lvl(?) = lvl(>) = 0
(iii) lvl(B ^ C) = lvl(B _ C) = max(lvl(B); lvl(C))
(iv) lvl(B  C) = max(lvl(B) + 1; lvl(C))
(v) lvl(8x:B) = lvl(9x:B) = lvl(B).
We now require that for every denitional clause 8x[p

t
4
= B], lvl(B)  lvl(p

t).
(If the denition is based on Horn clauses, then this restriction is trivial to
satisfy since no implications would occur in the body of denitional clauses.)
Cut-elimination for this use of denition within intuitionistic logic was proved
in [14] and [17] and is modeled on proofs by Tait and Martin-Lof that use the
technical notions of normalizability and reducibility. In fact, that proof also
allowed the logic to contain a formulation of induction, a topic we return to
later.
We can think of denitions as a technique to introduce logical equivalences
in such a way that we do not introduce into proof search meaningless cycles:
that is, if we simply considered H  B, then when proving a sequent con-
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taining H, we could replace it with B, which could then be replaced with H,
etc.
To illustrate the strengthening of logic that can result from adding de-
nitions in this way, consider the motivating sequent above. We rst convert
the two Horn clauses representing the evaluation rules for the conditional into
the following denitional clauses. (We employ the usual convention that free
variables in displayed denitional clauses are implicitly universally quantied
around that clause.)
(if B M N)+V
4
= B + true ^M +V:
(if B M N)+V
4
= B + false ^N +V:
This sequent then has the following simple and immediate proof.
B + true;M +V  !M +V
initial
B + true ^M +V  !M +V
^L
B + false;M +V  !M +V
initial
B + false ^M +V  !M +V
^L
(if B M M)+V  !M +V
defL
In the paper [18], the expressive strength of denitions was studied in
greater depth. One example considered there involved attempting to capture
the notion of simulation and bisimulation for labelled transition systems. In
particular, assume that P
A
  ! P
0
is dened via clauses to which are added
the two clauses in Figure 1. These two clauses are a direct encoding of the
closure conditions for simulation and bisimulation. In [18] it was proved that if
the labeled transition system is nite (noetherian) then simulation and bisim-
ulation coincided exactly with provability of sim P Q and bisim P Q. The
restriction to noetherian transition systems is necessary since in such situ-
ations, these closure clauses have unique xed points and since provability
yields atoms that are true in all xed points, provability correctly charac-
terizes that xed point. In transition systems with innite paths, the least
xed point and greatest xed point dier, so provability no longer captures
only the greatest xed point (simulation and bisimulation are greatest xed
points). If, however, the transition system is nitely branching, then induction
can be used to characterize the greatest xed point by repeatedly applying
the closure operator to the trivially true relation.
In Section 5 we show how we can capture simulation and bisimulation for
the (nite) -calculus in a similar style.
3 Should we explicitly reference provability?
Although we have now succeeded in giving the sequent (if B M M)+V  !
M +V a natural proof using this proof theoretic notion of denition, it appears
that we need to revisit what we really have in mind for that sequent. It seems
4
sim P Q
4
= 8A8P
0
: P
A
  ! P
0
 9Q
0
: Q
A
  ! Q
0
^ sim P
0
Q
0
bisim P Q
4
= [8A8P
0
:P
A
  ! P
0
 9Q
0
:Q
A
  ! Q
0
^ bisim P
0
Q
0
] ^
[8A8Q
0
:Q
A
  ! Q
0
 9P
0
:P
A
  ! P
0
^ bisim Q
0
P
0
]
Fig. 1. Simulation and bisimulation as denitions.
more natural that what we intend to prove is rather: \if (if B M M)+V is
provable then M +V is provable." To explore this possibility, consider intro-
ducing the predicate .  that serves as an operator for provability. In this case,
we now need to distinguish between two logics, one meta-level logic and one
object-level logic. To do so, we shall use the type o to denote meta-level logical
expressions and obj to denote object-level logical expressions. The meta-logic
uses the symbols 8

of type ( ! o) ! o, 9

of type ( ! o) ! o and ^
and , both of type o ! o ! o for universal and existential quantication
at type , for conjunction, and for implication, respectively. The object-logic
uses the symbols
V

of type ( ! obj) ! obj and & and ), both of type
obj ! obj ! obj for universal quantication at type , for conjunction, and
for implication, respectively. (The type subscripts for 8

and
V

will often be
dropped if they can be easily inferred or are not important.) As is the usual
convention, the expression
V
x will be abbreviated as simply
V
x.
To encode the provability relation for the object-logic, we copy the struc-
ture of a logic programming interpreter following the completeness theorems
for uniform proofs and backchaining found in, say, [19], or the notion of focused
proof [1,22]. Our interpreter will use the following four predicates: provability
is denoted by . and has type obj ! o, backchaining is denoted by the inx
symbol / and has type obj ! obj ! o, atomic of type obj ! o decides if
an object-level formula is atomic, and prog, also of type obj ! o, decides if
a formula is an object-level assumption (object-level logic program). A Horn
clause interpreter will be written as the denition in Figure 2. Notice that
in both the .  and  /  expression, the triangle points to the formula for
which (object-level) introductions rules are considered (right-rules for .  and
left-rules for  / ).
The full specication of provability at the object level would then require
additional denitional clauses for specifying what are atomic object-level for-
mulas and what formulas constitute the object-level Horn clause specica-
tion. Examples of such clauses are given in Figure 3. Here, + has type
tm! tm! obj, where tm is the type of the intended programming language
that we are attempting to encode the operational semantics. We can now
prove the sequent
.(if B M M)+V  ! .M +V:
Proposition 3.1 An atomic judgment has a proof using inference gures if
and only if it has a proof using .  (Figure 2) in which the inference gures
are encoded as atomic  and prog  clauses (as in Figure 3).
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.(G&G
0
)
4
= .G ^ .G
0
:
.A
4
= atomic A ^ prog D ^D / A:
A / A
4
= atomic A:
(G) D) / A
4
= D / A ^ .G:
(
V

:Dx) / A
4
= 9

t (D t / A):
Fig. 2. Interpreter for object-level specications.
atomic (M +V )
4
= >:
prog (
V
B
V
M
V
N
V
V [B + true&M +V  (if B M N)+V ])
4
= >:
prog (
V
B
V
M
V
N
V
V [B + false&N +V  (if B M N)+V ])
4
= >:
Fig. 3. Specication of object-level inference rules via Horn clauses.
Proof outline. Applications of inference gures correspond exactly to the
selection of prog clauses for backchaining over. The completeness for the
treatment of the goal-reduction and backchaining steps follows from familiar
completeness theorems for logic programs [27]. 2
Having now described this interpreter, it is interesting to note that, al-
though conceptually there might be important distinctions arising from using
., provability of M +V directly from its Horn clause specication or indi-
rectly via the use of this interpreter are essentially the same: (uniform) proofs
in one setting map naturally to (uniform) proofs in the other setting. From
a practical point of view, this distinction does not provide any proof search
advantages.
If we leave Horn clauses for a logic with universally quantied judgments,
then a dierence does appear. We look at this next.
4 -tree syntax and generic judgments
It is a common observation that rst-order terms are not expressive enough
to capture rich syntactic structures declaratively. In particular, such terms do
not permit a direct encoding of the syntactic category of \abstraction" and
the associated notions of -conversion and substitution.
4.1 Syntactic representation of abstractions
The encoding style called higher-order abstract syntax [35] views such abstrac-
tions as functional expressions that relying on the full power of -conversion
in a typed -calculus setting to perform substitutions. The computer systems
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Prolog, Elf, Isabelle, and Coq, to name a few, all implement a form HOAS
and many earlier papers have appeared exploiting this style of syntactic rep-
resentation [24,25,26,34]. Since the earliest papers, however, there has been a
tendency to consider richer -calculi as foundations for HOAS, moving away
from the simply typed -calculus setting where it was rst exploited. Trying to
encode a syntactic category of abstraction by placing it within a rich function
spaces can cause signicant problems (undecidable unication, exotic terms,
etc) that might seem rather inappropriate if one is only trying to develop a
simple treatment of syntax.
The notion of -tree syntax [28,23] was introduced to work around these
complexities. Here, -abstractions are not general functions: they can only
be applied to other, internally bound variables. Substitution of general values
is not part of the equality theory in the -term syntax approach: it must be
coded as a separate judgment via logic. This weaker approach has a much
simpler equality theory, yielding a unication setting (called L

[20] or higher-
order pattern unication [32,33]) which is decidable and unary. The rela-
tionship between the -tree approach where abstractions are applied to only
internal bound variable and HOAS where abstractions can be applied to gen-
eral terms is rather similar to the distinctions made in the -calculus between

I
, which only allows \internal mobility" [38] and the full -calculus, where
\external mobility" is also allowed (via general substitutions). In Section 5.2,
we will see that this comparison is not accidental. In this paper, we generally
view syntax as encoded using -trees.
4.2 Generic judgments as atomic meta-level judgments
When using HOAS or -tree syntax representations, inference rules of the
form
V
x:Gx
A
;
are often encountered. If one were to capture this in the interpreter described
in Figure 2, there would need to be a way to interpret universally quantied
goals. One is tempted to augment that earlier interpreter with the following
clause:
.(
^

x:G x)
4
= 8

x[.G x];(1)
that is, the object-level universal quantier would be interpreted using the
meta-level universal quantier. While this is a common approach to dealing
with object-level universal quantication, this encoding causes some problems
when attempting to reason about logic specications containing generic judg-
ments.
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For example, consider proving the query 8y
1
8y
2
[q hy
1
; t
1
i hy
2
; t
2
i hy
2
; t
3
i];
where h; i is used to form pairs, from the three clauses
q X X Y:
q X Y X:
q Y X X:
This query succeeds only if t
2
and t
3
are equal. In particular, we would like
to prove the sequent
.(
^
y
1
^
y
2
[q hy
1
; t
1
i hy
2
; t
2
i hy
2
; t
3
i])  ! t
2
= t
3
;
where t
1
, t
2
, and t
3
are eigenvariables and with a denition that consists of
the clause (1), those clauses in Figure 2, and the following clauses:
X = X
4
= >
prog (
V
X
V
Y q X X Y )
4
= >
prog (
V
X
V
Y q X Y X)
4
= >
prog (
V
X
V
Y q Y X X)
4
= >
Using these denitional clauses, this sequent reduces to
.(q hs
1
; t
1
i hs
2
; t
2
i hs
2
; t
3
i)  ! t
2
= t
3
;
for some terms s
1
and s
2
. This latter sequent is provable only if s
1
and s
2
are chosen to be two non-uniable terms. This style proof is quite unnatural
and it also depends on the fact that the underlying type that is quantied in
8y
1
8y
2
is non-empty.
Additionally, if we use the rule (1) then whenever .(
V

x:G x) is provable,
the meta-level atomic formula .(G t) is provable for all terms t of type . While
this is likely to be appropriate when the object-language is a conventional
logic, it is not likely to be appropriate when one encodes something like the
-calculus where an object-level universal quantier might be used to encode
restriction but where the presence of, say, a match prex means that general
substitutions may not be applicable to judgments generally.
For these reasons, the conversion of an object-level universal quantier into
a meta-level universal quantier in (1) must be judged inappropriate. We now
look for a dierent approach.
Consider the rule for proving a universal formula:
 ; c :  ` Pc
  `
V

x:Px
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where c is an eigenvariable with the usual restriction that c is not free in the
lower sequent. Here, P is a variable of higher type, and the context,  , denotes
a set of distinct typed eigenvariables. If we see the judgment   `
V

x:Px
as \atomic" and that this is the only way to prove a universally quantied
formula, then this rule can be inverted: that is, if
V

x:Px is provable assuming
the variables in   are generic then Pc is provable assuming that c is also
generic. Whether or not that generic c can be instantiated and yield another
valid judgment is dependent on the object-level itself. In other words, we
will require that this universally quantied variable acts as a bound variable
but will not assume that it can be arbitrarily instantiated: using an analogy
from before, we will assume that we can apply this abstraction to another
abstracted variable but not to an arbitrary value.
Thus we need to encode the object-level judgment x
1
; : : : ; x
n
` (Px
1
: : : x
n
),
where the variables on the left are all distinct and understood as bound entirely
within this judgment, as an atomic formula in our meta-logic. We mention two
ways to achieve this encoding. The rst introduces a \local" binders using a
family of constants, say, loc

of type ( ! obj)! obj. The above expression
would be something of the form
loc

1
x
1
: : : loc

n
x
n
: Px
1
: : : x
n
:
While this encoding is natural, it hides the top-level structure of Px
1
: : : x
n
under a prex of varying length. Unication and matching, which are central
to the functioning of the denition introduction rules, would not be able to
directly access that top-level structure. The second alternative employs a
coding technique used by McDowell [14,15]. Here, one abstraction, say for a
variable l of type evs (eigenvariables), is always written over the judgment and
is used to denote the list of distinct variables x
1
; : : : ; x
n
. Individual variables
are then accessed via the projections 

of type evs !  and ^ of type evs !
evs. For example, the judgment x : a; y : b; z : c ` Pxyz could be encoded as
either the expression loc
a
xloc
b
yloc
c
z:Pxyz; or as
l(P (
a
l)(
b
(^l))(
c
(^(^l)))):
In this second, preferred encoding, the abstraction l denotes a list of variables,
the rst variable being of type a, the second being of type b, and the third of
type c.
4.3 A interpreter for generic judgments
An interpreter for generic judgments is displayed in Figure 4. This interpreter
generalizes the previous interpreter by allowing for the additional abstraction
over evs. Here, the three meta-level predicates atomic , prog , and .  all have
the type (evs ! obj)! o while / has the type (evs ! obj)! (evs ! obj)!
o. Notice that the technique of replacing the abstraction l:
V

w:(G l w))
9
.l
((G l) & (G
0
l))
4
= .
l
(Gl) ^ .
l
(G
0
l):
.
l
(
V

w:(G l w))
4
= .
l
(G(^l)(

l)):
.
l
(Al)
4
= atomic A ^ progD ^ (Dl) /
l
(Al):
(Al) /
l
(Al)
4
= atomic A:
((G l)) (D l)) /
l
(Al)
4
= (Dl) /
l
(Al) ^ .
l
(Gl):
(
V

w:(D l)) /
l
(Al)
4
= 9
evs!
t:(D l (t l) /
l
(Al)):
Fig. 4. An interpreter for simple generic judgments.
with l:G(^l)(l)) is really the same as replacing the judgment
x
1
; : : : ; x
n
` 8y(Pyx
1
: : : x
n
) with x
1
; : : : ; x
n
; x
n+1
` (Px
1
: : : x
n
x
n+1
):
Notice that this interpreter is not in L

for two reasons. First, the def-
initional clause for interpreting (l:
V

w:(G l w)) contains the expression
(l:G(^l)(

l)) and the subterms (^l) and (

l) are not distinct bound vari-
ables. They are, however, distinct object-level variables so it should be a rather
simple matter to extend the technical denition of L

to also allow for this
style encoding of object-level variables. A second reason that this interpreter
is not in L

is the denitional clause for backchaining over (l:
V

w:(D l w))
since this clause contains the expression (l:D l (t l)), which requires apply-
ing an abstraction to a general (external) term t. Such a specication can be
made into an L

specication by encoding object-level substitution as an ex-
plicit judgment [21]. The fact that this specication is not in L

simply means
that when we apply the left-introduction rule for denitions, unication may
not produce a most general unier.
Proposition 4.1 Let n   1 and let x
0
: 
0
; : : : ; x
n
: 
n
be distinct variables
such that (Px
0
: : : x
n
) is an atomic formula in which the variables x
0
; : : : ; x
n
are not free in P . The judgment x
0
; : : : ; x
n
` (Px
1
: : : x
n
) has a proof using
inference gures (admitting universally quantied premises) if and only if
.
l
P (

0
l)    (

n
(^
n
l))
has a proof using the interpreter in Figure 4 in which the inference gures are
encoded as atomic  and prog  clauses (as in Figure 3).
Proof outline. Applications of inference gures correspond exactly to the
selection of prog clauses for backchaining over. Here, the use of  and ^ ensures
that object-level eigenvariables are represented by new terms at the meta-level.
For this encoding to work properly, we also assume that no constants at the
object-level have types involving evs. 2
Other judgments besides generic judgments can be encoded similarly. For
example, in [14,15], hypothetical as well as linear logic judgments were en-
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coded along these lines. The main objective in those papers is to encode an
object-level sequent as atomic judgments in a meta-logic. We focus on generic
judgments here because of their relationship to abstractions within syntax.
5 The -calculus
To illustrate the use of this style representation of universal judgments, we
turn, as many others have done [28,11,3,37], to consider encoding the -
calculus. In particular, we follow the presentation in [28] for the syntax and
one-step operational semantics.
5.1 Syntax
We shall follow the presentation of the -calculus given in [29]. We need three
primitive syntactic categories: name for channels, proc for processes, and
action for actions. The output prex is the constructor out of type name !
name ! proc ! proc and the input prex is the constructor in of type
name! (name! proc)! proc: the -calculus expressions xy:P and x(y):P
are represented as (out x y P ) and (in x y:P ), respectively. We use j and
+, both of type proc ! proc ! proc and written as inx, to denote parallel
composition and summation, and  of type (name! proc)! proc to denote
restriction. The -calculus expression (x)P will be encoded as n:P , which
itself is abbreviated as simply x:P . The match operator, [ = ] is of type
name ! name ! proc ! proc. When  is written as a prex, it has type
proc! proc. When  is written as an action, it has type action. The symbols
# and ", both of type name ! name ! action, denote the input and output
actions, respectively, on a named channel with a named value.
We shall deal with only nite -calculus expression, that is, expressions
without ! or dened constants. Extending this work to innite process ex-
pressions can be done using induction, as outlined in [18] or by adding an
explicit co-induction proof rule dual to the induction rule. Fortunately, the
nite expressions are rich enough to illustrate the issues regarding syntax and
abstractions that are the focus of this paper.
Proposition 5.1 Let P be a nite -calculus expression using the syntax of
[29]. If the free names of P are admitted as constants in the meta-logic of type
name then P corresponds uniquely to a -equivalence class of terms of type
proc.
5.2 One-step transitions
The transition semantics uses two predicates: 

  !  of type proc ! action!
proc ! obj; and 

  *  of type proc ! (name ! action) ! (name !
proc) ! o. The rst of these predicates encodes transitions involving free
values and the second encodes transitions involving bound values. Figure 5
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species the one step transition system for the \core" -calculus. Figure 6
provides the increment to the core rules to get the late transition system, and
Figure 7 gives the increment to the core to get the early transition system.
Note that all the rules in the core system belong to the L

subset of logic
specications: that is, abstractions are applied to only abstracted variables
(either bound by a -abstraction or bound by a universally quantier in the
premise of the rule). Furthermore, note that each of the increments for the
late and early systems involve at least one clause that is not in L

. The core
system of rules has also been singled out and named 
I
[38] since it only allows
for \internal" mobility of names, that is, local (restricted) names only being
passed to abstractions.
One advantage of this style of specication over the traditional one [29]
is the absence of complicated side-conditions on variables: they are handled
directly by the logical mechanisms described above.
In order for this theory of one-step transitions to be interpreted by the
prover given in Figure 4, we need to take the following steps.

Convert the inference rules of either the core, late, or early system into prog
clauses. This is straightforward (as illustrated in Section 1).

Axiomatize the atomic predicate, which would simply be the two denitional
clauses
atomic (P
A
  ! Q)
4
= >
atomic (P
A
  * Q)
4
= >

One clause for the .  and one clause for  /  are parametrized by a type .
Here, the clause for .  needs just one instance for  equal to name while
/  needs 7 dierent instances on each for  set equal to name, action, proc,
name! name, name! action, name ! proc, and name! name! proc.
Proposition 5.2 Let P
A
  ! Q be provable in late (resp., early) transition
system of [29]. If A is either  or # xy or " xy then .
l
P
A
  ! Q is provable
from the clauses for the interpreter plus the clauses encoding late (resp., early)
transitions. (Here, P , A, and Q are all translated to the corresponding meta-
level expression.) If A is x(y) then .
l
P
# x
  * R and if A is x(y) then .
l
P
" x
  *
R. Here, R is the meta-level representation of the -abstraction of y over Q.
Proof Outline. Follows almost directly from Propositions 4.1 and 5.1. The
induction needs to be strengthen slightly to handle the case where the bound
variable l in .
l
are free in the judgment, which can happen, of course, when a
universally quantied goal is interpreted. 2
Since the types of P and P
0
are dierent in the expression P
A
  * P
0
, we
cannot immediately form the transitive closure of this relationship to give a
notion of a sequence of transitions. It is necessary to lower the type of P
0
rst
by applying it to a term of type name. How this is done, depends on what we
12
:P

  ! P

P
A
  ! Q
[x = x]P
A
  ! Q
match
P
A
  * Q
[x = x]P
A
  * Q
match
P
A
  ! R
P +Q
A
  ! R
sum
Q
A
  ! R
P +Q
A
  ! R
sum
P
A
  * R
P +Q
A
  * R
sum
Q
A
  * R
P +Q
A
  * R
sum
P
A
  ! P
0
P jQ
A
  ! P
0
jQ
par
Q
A
  ! Q
0
P jQ
A
  ! P jQ
0
par
P
A
  *M
P jQ
A
  * n(MnjQ)
par
Q
A
  * N
P jQ
A
  * n(P jNn)
par
V
n(Pn
A
  ! P
0
n)
n:Pn
A
  ! n:P
0
n
res
V
n(Pn
A
  * P
0
n)
n:Pn
A
  * m n:(P
0
mn)
res
out x y P
"xy
  ! P
output
in x M
#x
  *M
input
V
y(My
"xy
  !M
0
y)
y:My
"x
  *M
0
open
P
#x
  *M Q
"x
  * N
P jQ

  ! n:(MnjNn)
close
P
"x
  *M Q
#x
  * N
P jQ

  ! n:(MnjNn)
close
Fig. 5. The core -calculus in -tree syntax.
P
#x
  *M Q
"xy
  ! Q
0
P jQ

  ! (My)jQ
0
L-com
P
"xy
  ! P
0
Q
#x
  * N
P jQ

  ! P
0
j(Ny)
L-com
Fig. 6. The additional rules for late -calculus.
in x M
#xy
  !My
E-input
P
"xy
  ! P
0
Q
#xy
  ! Q
0
P jQ

  ! P
0
jQ
0
E-com
Q
#xy
  ! Q
0
P
"xy
  ! P
0
P jQ

  ! P
0
jQ
0
E-com
Fig. 7. The additional rules for early -calculus.
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sim
l
(P l) (Ql)
4
= 8A8P
0
[.
l
(P l
Al
  ! P
0
l)  9Q
0
.
l
(Ql
Al
  ! Q
0
l)^
sim
l
(P
0
l) (Q
0
l)] ^
8X8P
0
[.
l
(P l
#(Xl)
  * P
0
l)  9Q
0
.
l
(Ql
#(Xl)
  * Q
0
l)^
8w sim
l
(P
0
lw) (Q
0
lw)] ^
8X8P
0
[.
l
(P l
"(Xl)
  * P
0
l)  9Q
0
.
l
(Ql
"(Xl)
  * Q
0
l)^
sim
l
(P
0
(^l)(l)) (Q
0
(^l)(l))]
Fig. 8. Denitional clause for simulation of -calculus
are trying to model. In the next section, we consider modeling simulation.
5.3 Simulation of -expressions
For simplicity, we shall consider only simulation and not bisimulation: extend-
ing to bisimulation is not diÆcult (see Figure 1) but does introduce several
more cases and make our examples more diÆcult to read.
Figure 8 presents a denitional clause for simulation. Here, the meta-
logical predicate sim is of type (evs ! proc) ! (evs ! proc) ! o and again,
we abbreviate the expression sim(l:P l)(l:Ql) as sim
l
(P l)(Ql). Here, X has
type evs ! name, P has type evs ! proc, and P
0
has two dierent types,
evs ! proc and evs ! name ! proc. Since the only occurrence of 

is such
that  is name, we shall drop the subscript on . Notice also that for this set
of clauses to be successfully stratied, the level of sim must be strictly greater
than the level of all the other predicates of the interpreter (which can all be
equal).
Notice also that sim is a meta-level predicate while 

  !  and 

  *  are
object-level predicates. This is a required separation since simulation needs
to encompass the provability of these one-step translation relations. This is
dierent from the encoding in [18] (Figure 1) since no universal judgments
were needed to encoded CCS and hence the object/meta-level distinction was
not needed.
The rst conjunct in the body of the clause in Figure 8 deals with the case
where a process makes either a  step or a free input or output action. In
these cases, the variable A would be bound to either l: (in the rst case) or
l: # (N l)(M l) or l: " (N l)(M l), in which cases, N and M would be of
the form l:(^
i
l) for some non-negative integer i.
The last two cases correspond to when a bounded input or output action
is done. In the case of the bounded input (the second conjunct), a universal
quantier of the meta-logic, 8w, is used to instantiate the abstractions (P
0
and Q
0
), whereas in the bounded output case (the third conjunct), a universal
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quantier of the object-level is emulated: such an internal quantier is im-
mediately replaced by using a new variable in the context, via the use of 
and ^. This one denition clause thus illustrates important distinctions about
meta-level and object-level: in particular, the observation that simulation is
encoded as a meta-level predicate and not an object-level predicate (as with
the one-step predicates) and that the universal quantiers in both logics each
have their applications and should not be confused.
5.4 Modal Logics for -calculus
To further illustrate the ease of handling and encoding binding structures, we
now encode the modal logic for the for -calculus given in [30] (of necessity,
we consider only binary conjunctions instead of general, indexed conjunc-
tions). We rst introduce the new type assert to denote assertion forms and
then introduce the following constructors of this type: true : assert for true,
 and  : assert ! assert ! assert for conjunction, not  : assert ! assert for
negation, h = i : name ! name ! assert ! assert for the match modal,
hi : action ! assert ! assert for the possibility modal for non-binding ac-
tions, and the following four modal operators used to encode the possibility
of a bound actions: h# i; h# i
L
; h# i
E
; h" i : name ! (name ! assert) !
assert. The rst three of these modals are used to code the \basic", \late",
and \early" versions of the bounded input prex while the forth encodes the
bounded output action. Natural numbers are encoded as the type nat with
constants z : nat and succ : nat ! nat. The satisfaction relation is dened
using two predicates: j= at type (evs ! proc) ! (evs ! assert) ! o as well
as at the type nat ! (evs ! proc) ! (evs ! assert) ! o. This extra argu-
ment is used to help stratify this denition in the presence of negation in the
assertion language. The predicate depth is of type (evs ! assert)! nat ! o
and the expression depth(l:Bl) N is abbreviated as simply depth
l
(Bl;N).
This predicate holds if N is an upper bound on the nesting of negations in
the (Bl) formula: this number is used to pick a suitable level to start the
use of the stratied version of satisfaction. As we have done before, the ex-
pression j= (l:P l) (l:Bl) is abbreviated as P l j=
l
Bl while the expression
j=
i
(l:P l) (l:Bl) is abbreviated as P l j=
i
l
Bl.
To properly stratify the denition in Figure 9, a slight generalization to
the denition of levels for predicates needs to be made. In particular, we need
to see the expression j=
i
as a predicate of level i and then give the predicate j=
the level !. In other words, levels need to be generalized beyond nite ordinal.
6 Related and future work
Of course, the value of this approach to encoding the -calculus comes, in
part, from the ability to automate proofs using such denitions. For example,
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P l j=
l
Bl
4
= 9i:depth
l
(Bl; i) ^ P l j=
i
l
Bl
depth
l
(true; N)
4
= >
depth
l
((B
1
l) and (B
2
l); N)
4
= depth
l
(B
1
l; N) ^ depth
l
(B
2
l; N)
depth
l
(not(Bl); succ N)
4
= depth
l
(Bl;N)
depth
l
(hXl = Y liBl;N)
4
= depth
l
(Bl;N)
depth
l
(hAliBl;N)
4
= depth
l
(Bl;N)
depth
l
(h# AliBl;N)
4
= depth
l
(B(^l)(l); N)
depth
l
(h# Ali
E
Bl;N)
4
= depth
l
(B(^l)(l); N)
depth
l
(h# Ali
L
Bl;N)
4
= depth
l
(B(^l)(l); N)
depth
l
(h" AliBl;N)
4
= depth
l
(B(^l)(l); N)
P l j=
i
l
true
4
= >
P l j=
i
l
(B
1
l) and (B
2
l)
4
= P l j=
i
l
B
1
l ^ P j=
i
l
B
2
l
P l j=
i+1
l
not(Bl)
4
= (P l j=
i
l
Bl)  ?
P l j=
i
l
hXl = XliBl
4
= P j=
i
l
B
Pl j=
i
l
hAliBl
4
= .
l
P l
Al
  ! P
0
l ^ P
0
l j=
i
l
Bl
P l j=
i
l
h# AliBl
4
= 9P
0
9z(.
l
P l
Al
  * P
0
l ^ P
0
lz j=
i
l
Blz)
P l j=
i
l
h# Ali
E
Bl
4
= 8z9P
0
(.
l
P l
Al
  * P
0
l ^ P
0
lz j=
i
l
Blz)
P l j=
i
l
h# Ali
L
Bl
4
= 9P
0
8z(.
l
P l
Al
  * P
0
l ^ P
0
lz j=
i
l
Blz)
P l j=
i
l
h" AliBl
4
= 9P
0
(.
l
P l
Al
  * P
0
l ^ P
0
(^l)(l) j=
i
l
B(^l)(l))
Fig. 9. Denition of a process satisfying an assert formula.
one would hope that the sequent
assert
l
(Bl); P l j=
l
Bl; sim
l
(P l)(Ql)  ! Ql j=
l
Bl;
would have a simple, natural proof (where the predicate assert
l
() describes
a subset of the modal logic that would correspond to simulation). Jeremie
Wajs and the author are working on a tactic-style theorem prover for a logic
with induction and denitions. This system, called Iris, is written entirely
in Nadathur's Teyjus implementation [31] of Prolog and appears to be the
rst theorem proving system to be written entirely using higher-order abstract
syntax (parser, printer, top-level, tactics, tacticals, etc). Example proofs that
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we have done by hand come out as expected: they are rather natural and
immediate, although the encoding of eigenvariable context as a single abstrac-
tion makes expressions rather awkward to read. Fortunately, simple printing
and parsing conventions can improve readability greatly. Given that the in-
terpreter in Figure 4 is based on Horn clauses denitions, it is possible to
employ well known induction principles for Horn clauses to help prove such
properties.
There are various other calculi, such as the join and ambient calculi, in
which names and name restriction are prominent and we plan to test this style
of encoding with them. Generic judgments have been used to model names for
references and exceptions [22,2] so it would be interesting to see if this style
of encoding can adequately help in reasoning about programming language
semantics containing such features. Comparing this particular encoding of
the -calculus with those of others, for example, [11,3,37], should be done in
some detail.
Finally, the approach to encoding syntax and operational semantics used
here is strongly motivated by proof theoretic considerations. There has been
much work lately on using a more model-theoretic or categorical-theoretic
approaches for such syntactic representations, see for example [4,5,10]. Com-
paring those two approaches should be quite illuminating.
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